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I. INTRODUCTION
The "A-Team," a popular U.S. action television show of the
1980's, featured four former U.S. military personnel who were
wrongly convicted of a crime, escaped from prison, and then be-
came mercenaries for hire.1 When a person had a problem and
there was no one else to turn to, the "A-Team" was there to
help. 2 Today, there exist dozens of private military firms
(PMFs),3 also known as private military companies (PMCs), 4
which fill the same niche as the "A-Team." At the end of the
Cold War, most of the world's militaries downsized, leaving
many professionally trained soldiers jobless.5 Former generals
became CEOs of new private companies that sold their services
of giving military advice, training, support, logistics, and spe-
cial operations to whomever was willing to pay.6 These firms
exist as private corporations and, like the "A-Team,"7 most of
their personnel are former members of national militaries.8
Former soldiers from the United States, Great Britain, conti-
nental Europe, Israel, South Africa, the former Soviet Union,
and Nepal hung up their national uniforms and joined these
PMFs. 9
1 A-Team Shrine, www.ateamshrine.co.uk (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) [here-
inafter A-Team Shrine].
2 See id.
3 See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILI-
TARY INDUSTRY 243 (Cornell University Press 2003) [hereinafter SINGER, CORPO-
RATE WARRIORS].
4 See Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize
and Regulate Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003).
5 See Nathaniel Stinnett, Note, Regulating the Privatization of War: How to
Stop Private Military Firms from Committing Human Rights Abuses, 28 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 211, 214 (2005).
6 See Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Demo-
cratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1001, 1022
(2004).
7 See A-Team Shrine, supra note 1.
8 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 9.
9 See id.; see also Tina Garmon, Comment, Domesticating International Cor-
porate Responsibility: Holding Private Military Firms Accountable under the Alien
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Since the early 1990's, PMFs have been involved in some
capacity with virtually every conflict in the world.10 However,
because of the speed with which PMFs as military actors have
burst onto the international scene, public policy and law, both
international and domestic, have not yet caught up to prac-
tice.'1 The result is that PMFs are largely outside the scope of
international law. 12 This legal anomaly presents two problems:
(1) it is extremely difficult to hold PMFs as corporations, or
their individual employees, responsible for human rights
abuses they commit,13 and (2) these private military personnel
(PMPs) are not protected under international law for human
rights abuses committed against them.14 These problems have
left the abstract and have already manifested themselves in
real world examples. In 2000, an American-based PMF,
DynCorp, was hit with a scandal in which seven of its employ-
ees allegedly owned prostitutes, one as young as twelve-years-
old, while working in Bosnia. 15 Since these employees were not
members of the U.S. military, or any other national military,
none were ever criminally prosecuted.1 6 Instead, DynCorp fired
the employee who blew the whistle on the prostitution ring.17
In March of 2004, four Americans were ambushed and killed in
Fallujah, Iraq, and two of their bodies were mutilated, dragged
through the streets, hung over a bridge, burned, and eventually
driven away.18 These Americans were not GI's but rather were
civilians serving as private contractors. 19 Both of these exam-
Tort Claims Act, 11 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 330 (2003); Milliard, supra note
4, at 11.
10 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 9.
11 See P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military
Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521 (2004) [hereinafter
Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law].
12 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 216-17.
13 See id.
14 This Comment starts from the premise that since no authority has ever
said that PMPs are protected, and many hint that their status in international law
is ambiguous, that they are in fact not protected.
15 See Nelson D. Schwartz, The Pentagon's Private Army, FORTUNE, Mar. 17,
2003, available at 2003 WLNR 13891324, *5.
16 See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 525.
17 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 215.
18 See Ellen L. Frye, Note, Private Military Firms in the New World Order:
How Redefining "Mercenary" Can Tame the "Dogs of War," 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
2607, 2609 (2005).
19 See id.
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ples represent failures in the international law system to either
regulate or protect private military personnel.
This Comment argues that PMFs need to be regulated to
hold them accountable for their human rights abuses and curb
further illegal actions. It also argues that along with regulation
should also come protection under international law. Part II of
this Comment discusses the history of private military actors
from mercenaries in antiquity to the PMFs in the present, high-
lighting one example of a well-respected group of private actors
and another that was despised. This Comment then looks at a
sampling of activities of PMFs and looks at cases of human
rights abuses by PMPs. Part III discusses the efforts that have
been made to regulate PMFs and the successes and shortcom-
ings of these efforts. Part IV then argues that along with regu-
lation, protection of these real-life "A-Team[s]" should also be
advanced, specifically by giving PMPs unambiguous prisoner-
of-war (POW) status. It then explores a few methods of imple-
menting this legal protection. Finally, Part V concludes by em-
phasizing the necessity of both regulation of PMFs and
protection of their employees.
II. BACKGROUND
"Hiring outsiders to fight your battles is as old as war
itself. "20
The history of private actors in warfare can be traced at
least as far back as when Ramses II employed them in 1294
B.C. 21 They fought with the Greeks and the Romans, 22 hired
themselves out as "freelances" (which is where this modern bus-
iness term comes from)23 to princes in the Middle Ages and the
early Renaissance, and were employed by the British to fight
the American colonists in the Revolutionary War.24 Included
among the ranks of mercenaries are the legendary Gurkhas of
Nepal who served in the British Army, 25 the Swiss Guard that
20 SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 19.
21 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 212.
22 Id.
23 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 24.
24 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 213.
25 See ANTHONY MOCKLER, THE MERCENARIES 16 (1969).
[Vol. 18:531
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol18/iss2/6
MILITARY INC.
has protected the Pope since Julius II hired them in 1502,26 and
the Legionnaires of the French Foreign Legion.27 Mercenaries
faded from military engagements in the late 1800's, specifically
after the Franco-Prussian War, and nations from that time on
held a monopoly on war-making ability. 28  Mercenaries
reemerged in post-colonial Africa, were branded as criminals,
and became known as Les Affreux ("the horrors") because of
their horrible practices.29
A. The different species of PMFs
Like mercenaries, today's PMFs are primarily motivated by
profit,30 but the similarities between the two stop there. To-
day's PMFs differ from the soldiers of fortune of the past in that
they are corporate entities, traded on the open market and often
part of broader multi-national corporations. 31 Also, PMFs fill
many different niches in the war machine and are more than
hired foot soldiers used to bulk up the ranks of an army. These
new "A-Team[s]" not only fight alongside national armies, they
also train them and support them logistically.32 According to
author P.W. Singer, these PMFs can be broken down into three
different categories based on what services the firm provides:
military provider firms, military consulting firms, and military
support firms. 33
1. Military Provider Firms
Military Provider Firms employ their personnel at the fore-
front of the battle, either as actual troops engaged in fighting,
26 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 27.
27 See generally MOCKLER, supra note 25, at 130.
28 See id. at 15.
29 See id. at 145.
30 See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 525.
31 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS supra note 3, at 40.
32 See id. at 92-97.
33 See id. at 91. Often not included in analyses of private military firms, Mili-
tary Support Firms do just that-they support the national military to which they
are contracted out. This support comes in the form of logistics, technical support,
supply, and transportation. See id. at 126-27. Most PMPs employed in support
firms are usually towards the rear of the combat and are more often referred to as
civilian contractors than part of a privatized military firm. Id. at 97. Since these
contractors are given identity cards by the U.S. military that identify them as hav-
ing POW status, this Comment need not discuss them in further detail.
20061
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as specialists such as combat pilots, or as direct commanders
and controllers of forward deployed units.34 The best example
of a Military Provider Firm in action is the now dissolved South
African PMF Executive Outcomes' (EO) operation in Sierra Le-
one. 35 Made up of mostly apartheid-era South African Defense
Force (SADF) elite units, EO has been around since 1989.36 In
1993, the Angolan government hired EO forces to recapture
oilfields and the town of Soyo that were held by the rebel group,
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA).37 EO's hiring in Sierra Leone was based largely on its
success in Angola.38 Ironically, many of the EO personnel had
fought alongside UNITA as members of the SADF against the
Angolan government less than a decade before. 39 In 1995, the
Sierra Leone government hired EO to drive out the Revolution-
ary United Front (RUF) rebel force, which was imminently close
to seizing the capital.40 In addition, EO was charged with the
task of reestablishing control of the economically productive
parts of the country, specifically Sierra Leone's diamond
fields.41
Sierra Leone, a poor country torn apart by a bloody civil
war, could not afford the original one-year contract of $15 mil-
lion U.S. dollars. 42 Instead, Anthony Buckingham, who owned
a mining company that had operations in Sierra Leone, ban-
krolled the contract.43 In exchange, Buckingham received fu-
ture diamond mining concessions from the Sierra Leone
government. 44 Within nine days, 160 EO personnel had already
landed in Sierra Leone (most came directly from their last mis-
sion in Angola)45 and had pushed the rebels back from the capi-
34 See id. at 92.
35 See id. at 101.
36 See id. at 101-02.
37 See id. at 108-09.
38 See id.
39 See id. at 107-08. South Africa wanted to punish the Soviet-supported
Angolan government for its support of rebels fighting apartheid in Namibia and
South Africa and intervened to support UNITA against the Angolan government.
See id.
40 See id. at 112.
41 See id. at 112-13.
42 See id. at 112.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id.
[Vol. 18:531
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tal and into the jungles.46 EO then moved to secure the Kono
diamond fields (mostly because that was where their payment
was coming from) and with the help of an additional 200 em-
ployees, subsequently invaded the RUF stronghold in the Kan-
gari Hills.47 Within months after the operation, Sierra Leone
held multi-party civilian elections and the RUF signed a peace
agreement. 48 EO warned the new president that Sierra Leone's
newly earned stability would not last long and offered a 500-
man force to provide intelligence and protect the members of
the civilian cabinet.49 Within ninety-five days of rejecting this
offer, a bloody coup staged by RUF fighters and its allies dis-
placed the civilian government and killed hundreds of civil-
ians.50 Though Sierra Leone held elections in 2002, the country
has never recovered since EO pulled out.5 1
2. Military Consulting Firms
Military Consulting Firms provide expert military advice
and strategy to their clients. 52 The client gives them a particu-
lar situation, such as capturing territory or structuring a mili-
tary, and the firm analyzes the problem and develops a
solution.53 The key difference between Military Provider Firms
and Military Consulting Firms is that the client is the one "who
46 See id. at 112-13.
47 See id. at 113.
48 See id. at 113-14. The RUF only signed the agreement after it tried to
remobilize and EO destroyed its headquarters in the southeast part of the country.
See id. at 114. As with Angola, the peace agreement was conditioned upon EO's
withdrawal. See id.
49 See id. at 114.
50 See id. President Kabbah then hired Sandline International, another PMF,
to win back the country. See id. at 115. Sandline used the same tactics as EO did
and successfully fulfilled their contract. See id. This later proved embarrassing to
Western officials when it came to light that the British government, after raiding
Sandline's offices because Sandline's shipment of arms violated a U.N. embargo,
actually knew about Sandline's operation. See id.
51 See id. at 115. As for Executive Outcomes, it disbanded in 1999. See id. at
117. This action was most likely a reaction to a South African law, discussed later
in this Comment, that required a company like EO to seek government authoriza-
tion for each contract. See id. at 118. However, EO has produced many spin-off
PMFs started by former EO employees such as Southern Cross and NFD Ltd.,
which are still active today. See id.
52 See id. at 96.
53 See id. at 95.
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bears the final risks on the battlefield."54 Military Consulting
Firms can tell a client how to win the battle, but it is the client
who must actually execute the plan.5 5
Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is the
quintessential example of a Military Consulting Firm. Founded
in 1987 by eight former senior U.S. military officials, 56 MPRI's
leadership consists almost entirely of former top U.S. military
personnel and boasts that it has "more generals per square foot
than the Pentagon."57 The background of their employees, as
well as their location in Alexandria, Virginia (less than an hour
away from Washington D.C.), has helped MPRI to gain the
trust of the United States' government.58
Perhaps MPRI's most famous accomplishment is one for
which it does not even publicly take credit. 59 During 1994-95,
the U.S. State Department hired MPRI to serve as border
monitors and to enforce U.N. sanctions against Serbia.60 The
U.S. wanted to strengthen Croatia into a regional enforcer and
ally them with the Bosnians in order to balance the scales that
weighed heavily on the side of the Serbs.6 1 However, a U.N.
arms embargo prohibited the sale of weapons to any of the war-
ring Balkan nations, as well as any military training and ad-
vice, severely limiting any U.S. military involvement. 62 The
Pentagon referred the Croatian Defense Minister to MPRI and
two contracts were negotiated in early 1995.63 In August of
that same year, the Croatians launched a massive offensive
campaign called "Operation Storm," which was a huge suc-
cess.64 It was the first major victory against the Serbs and be-
54 Id. at 95.
55 See id. Though, according to Singer, lines between advising and imple-
menting can be somewhat blurred. See id. at 97. Employees of Vinnell went into
combat at the battle of Kha~i with the Saudi National Guard Units that they
trained. See id.
56 See id. at 119.
57 Michaels, supra note 6, at 1022 (citing Nicholas von Hoffman, Contract
Killers: How Privatizing the U.S. Military Subverts Public Oversight, HARPER'S,
June 2, 2004, at 79).
58 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 120.
59 See id. at 126.
60 See id. at 125.
61 See id.
62 See id.; see also Michaels, supra note 6, at 1027.
63 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 125.
64 See id. at 126.
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came the turning point in the war, eventually bringing the
Serbs to a ceasefire and signing the Dayton Agreement in No-
vember 1995.65 What caught the eye of Western officials was
the sophistication of military tactics used by the Croatians in
Operation Storm. 66 As the British colonel in charge of a U.N.
observer mission in the area said, "Whoever wrote that plan of
attack could have gone to any NATO staff college in North
America or Western Europe and scored an A-plus." 67 Though
MPRI denies any involvement in Operation Storm, it is hard to
ignore the fact that in less than a year, the Croatian army went
from a band of "rag-tag" soldiers to a professional military force
that executed a brilliantly planned military operation.68
B. PMF Activities Today
The private military industry is in the middle of a growth
boom right now, with several hundred companies earning over
$100 billion U.S. dollars in annual revenue. 69 In Iraq alone, it
is estimated that there are more than 15,000 private military
contractors. 70 PMFs provided security for L. Paul Bremer III,
the Chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and defended
locations inside the Green Zone 71 in Baghdad. 72 Vinnell Corpo-
ration, a U.S.-based PMF, 73 has the contract to train the New
Iraqi Army.74 Custer Battles, a self-described "international
business risk consultancy,"75 has been contracted out to guard
65 See id.
66 See id. at 126-27.
67 Id. at 127.
68 See id. at 126-27.
69 See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 523-24.
70 See Peter W. Singer, Outsourcing the War, SALON.COM, Apr. 16, 2004, http:ll
www.brook.edu/views/articles/fellows/singer2004O4l6.htm.
71 The Green Zone is the heavily protected area in Baghdad where the Iraqi
government and the U.S. and British embassies are located. See The All I Need,
Iraq Votes in Landmark Election, http://www.theallineed.com/news/0512/150749
20.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
72 See Frye, supra note 18, at 2610.
73 See Vinnell Corporation, http://www.vinnell.com (last visited Sept. 25,
2006).
74 See James R. Coleman, Note, Constraining Modern Mercenarism, 55 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1493, 1503 (2004).
75 Custer Battles, www.custerbattles.com/aboutus/index.html (last visited
Sept. 25, 2006).
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the Baghdad airport.7 6 PMF giant DynCorp has a multi-million
dollar contract to train the Iraqi police force. 77 Erinys Interna-
tional, another PMF, has 14,000 contractors working security
for Iraq's oil production facilities.78
Outside of Iraq, the U.S. government employs PMFs in
many different capacities. In October 2003, U.S. diplomats were
escorted through the Gaza Strip by DynCorp security forces and
three of the American contractors on the security detail died. 79
In Afghanistan, DynCorp was awarded a State Department
contract to protect Afghan leader Hamid Kharzai, replacing the
U.S. Special Forces troops who previously protected the foreign
leader.80 In South America, the U.S. employs PMFs to fight the
"war on drugs" by flying fumigation spray planes to destroy coca
fields in Columbia. 8' Perhaps the most shocking employment of
PMFs by the U.S. government is not in a distant foreign land
but on its own soil. In 1996, the Army hired MPRI to work in
the ROTC program (which trains new officers in college) as
professors of military science, effectively outsourcing at least
part of the task of training the Army's future leaders to a pri-
vate firm.8 2 One year later, the Army again hired MPRI, this
time to "write the Army field manuals on how to deal with ac-
quiring and managing contractors in a wartime environment,"8 3
meaning that a private military firm wrote the book telling the
Army how to interact with such firms.8 4
The use of PMF services extends beyond the U.S. and even
beyond state actors. In 2001, Great Britain began transferring
complete control of key military services, including air-to-air re-
fueling and aircraft support for the Royal Air Force to private
76 See Coleman, supra note 74, at 1503.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See Michaels, supra note 6, at 1036-37.
80 See Schwartz, supra note 15, at *2-3; see also Michaels, supra note 6, at
1003.
81 See Kristen McCallion, Comment, War for Sale! Battlefield Contractors in
Latin America & the 'Corporatization' of America's War on Drugs, 36 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 317, 320 (2005).
82 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 123. Army officers also
come from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point or can be commissioned after
first serving as an enlisted soldier and going through Officer Training School.
83 Id.
84 See id. at 123-24.
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companies.8 5 The United Nations has even considered privatiz-
ing part or all of its peacekeeping force and has already used
PMFs when it needed to assemble a U.N. police force or provide
airlift and logistics to peacekeepers. 6 Major industrial compa-
nies, notably oil and diamond companies, hire contractors to
guard their facilities or to train locals to do the same.8 7
C. PMPs as Human Rights Abusers
As the use of PMFs by governments, NGOs, and transna-
tional corporations rises, so does the possibility of human rights
abuses being committed by private military personnel (PMPs).
Though PMFs are a relatively recent phenomenon, there are al-
ready a few examples of their employees stepping outside the
bounds of international law. In 1995 when Executive Outcomes
(EO) conducted its operation in Sierra Leone, subordinates
asked their commanders how to distinguish between civilians
and rebels.88 "EO commanders supposedly [instructed] their pi-
lots to just "kill everybody."8 9 In 2000, news broke of a sex scan-
dal perpetrated by employees of DynCorp while in Bosnia. 90
Allegedly seven DynCorp employees owned and sold prosti-
tutes, including one as young as twelve years old.91 Neither the
U.S. government, the individuals, nor DynCorp were prosecuted
for these abuses, and the employee who blew the whistle on the
prostitution ring was fired by DynCorp for his troubles. 92
Lastly, two contractors, Steven Stephanowicz, who was an in-
terrogator, and John Israel, who worked as an interpreter, were
implicated in the Taguba report on the Abu Gharib prison
85 See id. at 12. The refueling contract on its own is expected to be worth more
than $15 billion U.S. dollars. See id.
86 See Traci Hukill, Should Peacekeepers be Privatized?, THE NAT'L J., May 15,
2004. Though there are strong advocates of integrating private forces with
peacekeepers, this is unlikely to happen in the near future. Many weaker coun-
tries fear that PMFs could be used against them, and other countries who contrib-
ute military forces to peacekeeping operations see PMFs as unwanted competition.
See Deborah Avant, Mercenaries, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 1, 2004, available at 2004
WLNR 11531068, *6.
87 See Avant, supra note 86, at *5.
88 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 215.
89 Id. (citing Garmon, supra note 9, at 326).
90 See Schwartz, supra note 15, at *5.
91 See id.; see also Stinnett, supra note 5, at 215.
92 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 215.
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abuses.93 The harshest punishment that was recommended for
the two civilians was an official reprimand to be placed in their
employment file and a revocation of their security clearances. 94
D. The Best and Worst Private Soldiers from the Past
1. The Condottieri of Renaissance Italy
The private military actors of the past that bear the closest
resemblance to the PMFs of today are the Condottieri of the
Italian Renaissance. 95 The relationship between the condot-
tiere (a mercenary captain) and his employer was kept strictly
professional, meaning there was never any suggestion of loyalty
or allegiance outside the terms of the condotta (the contract be-
tween the condottiere and his employer).96 Though loyalty to a
state or sovereign was never part of the agreement, the condot-
tiere would normally agree that once the term of the condotta
had run, he would not be a part of any hostilities against his
former employer for an additional period of time.97 A condotta
featured precise language, including the specified length and
terms of service, the number of men, and what pay the soldiers
were to receive. 98 Like any contract drawn up today, lawyers on
both sides did the legwork.99 Though first treated with disdain
by Italian princes and scholars, including Machiavelli, the Con-
dottieri quickly became the weapon of choice for virtually all of
Italy's wealthy city-states. 100 The Condottieri, their method of
contracting, and their professional nature bear a strong resem-
blance to their PMF counterparts.
93 See US Army 15-6 Report of Abuse of Prisoners in Iraq, art. 2.8 (Recom-
mendations)(1l)-(12) (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-
abuse report.pdf. This report was prepared by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, the
Deputy Commanding General Support of Coalition Forces Land Component Com-
mand (CFLCC). Although it was not intended to be released publicly, it has been
made widely available through the internet.
94 See id.
95 See MOCKLER, supra note 25, at 42.
96 See id. at 44-45.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 44.
99 See id.
100 See MOCKLER, supra note 25, at 47-49, 65.
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2. "Les Affreux" of Post-Colonial Africa
Due to the unstable nature of the newly independent Afri-
can nations in the 1960's and 1970's and to the support pro-
vided to competing factions by the two superpowers, mercenary
activity flourished.' 01 In contrast to the professional and
honored Condottieri, Les Affreux ("the horrors") left the world
with disdain for private soldiers. One of the most famous of
these soldiers of fortune was Coastas Giorgiou, who called him-
self "Callan.'10 2 Callan fought for the Front for National Liber-
ation of Angola (FNLA), which was supported by the U.S. both
financially and through the hiring of mercenaries. 10 3 The
FNLA was in a three-way power struggle with the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a South-
African-supported group, and the Marxist Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which was backed by the
Soviet Union and Cuba.10 4 Callan famously ordered the execu-
tion of thirteen of his own mercenaries for attempting to defect
from the FNLA and carried out a fourteenth execution himself
by shooting a man three times in the head with a pistol.1o5 The
brutality of Callan and other mercenaries during the first two
decades of African independence had a chilling effect on the
world community and, in large part, shaped world opinion of
private soldiers. 10 6
III. ATTEMPTS AT "A-TEAM" REGULATION: SUCCESSES
AND FAILURES
Regardless of what is thought about PMFs and their activi-
ties, there is no serious effort to outlaw them, either in individ-
ual states or on an international level. Their specialized and
relatively inexpensive services make PMFs a valuable tool for
national governments who are politically unwilling or economi-
cally unable to send their own troops to fight. 10 7 Also, PMFs
101 See Milliard, supra note 4, at 38-39.
102 Id. at 47-48.
103 See id. at 39, 48.
104 See id. at 39-40. Cuba sent over thousands over its own soldiers in support
of the MPLA.
105 See id. at 49. Callan and three others were sentenced to death without trial
by the MPLA-led Angolan government in 1976. See id. at 50.
106 See infra Part III.D.i, IV.A.i.
107 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 220.
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can potentially be very valuable in peacekeeping or intervention
operations.10 8 For example, in 1994 Western governments
would not recognize the genocide that was occurring in Rwanda
and refused to send in troops to defuse the situation. 0 9 A
small, specialized PMF may not have been able to stop the geno-
cide from happening, but they could have destroyed or jammed
the radio broadcasts, which incited and sustained the genocide,
and prevented or discouraged poorly armed militiamen from
killing and raping Tutsis. 110 Additionally, because of the large
volume of outsourcing to PMFs that has already occurred, most
governments would be hard-pressed to conduct a military oper-
ation without assistance from these private companies. As Paul
Lombardi, CEO of DynCorp, said, "You could fight without us,
but it would be difficult.""' Lastly, it may even be against in-
ternational law to ban PMFs. One academic posited that such
an action would violate Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
permits a country to act in its own self-defense. 1 12 While most
scholars agree that PMFs are here to stay, even the staunchest
supporters of PMFs agree that because they operate largely
outside the law, they need to be regulated in some fashion." 3
A. Self-regulation
PMFs argue that the industry should be self-regulated and
that the market will penalize those companies that do not act in
congruence with the law." 4 Additionally, if there is any formal
regulation, PMFs believe that they would be the best enforc-
ers. 1 5 One lobby group, the International Peace Operations
Association, wrote a voluntary code of conduct for all firms pro-
108 See Milliard, supra note 4, at 18-19.
109 See id. at 18.
110 See id. at 18-19. Radio Mille Collines, known as "Hate Radio," constantly
broadcasted messages inciting the Hutu majority to slaughter the Tutsi minority
in Rwanda. See id. It is also credited as one of the forces that kept the genocide
going for one hundred days. See id. at 19.
111 Schwartz, supra note 15, at *2.
112 See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 544;
U.N. Charter art. 51.
113 See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 521; see
also Stinnett, supra note 5, at 212; see also Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New
Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the
New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 75, 80 (1998).
114 See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 543.
115 See id.
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viding military services to follow. 116 Companies who are signa-
tories to the code agree, among other things, to adhere to the
Geneva Conventions, work only for legitimate clients (recog-
nized governments, international organizations, non-govern-
mental organizations, and lawful private companies), and
punish unlawful behavior of their employees. 11 7 However, be-
cause of the lack of enforcement methods, the demand for PMF
services, and the already recorded accounts of human rights
abuses committed by PMPs, self-regulation is not a viable
method to control the activities of PMFs.
B. Domestic Regulation in the United States
In 1968, Congress enacted the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) to authorize "the President to control the export and
import of defense articles and defense services."" The Inter-
national Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), which implements
the AECA, requires that any company selling military advice,
services, or sales to foreign nationals must first obtain a license
from the U.S. State Department. 19 Any contract exceeding $5
million U.S. dollars is subject to regulation by the Secretary of
Commerce and to Congressional notification. 120  While these
statutory regulations are important, they only cover PMFs
based in the United States; and with U.S.-based companies like
MPRI and Halliburton being so closely tied to the U.S. govern-
116 See International Peace Operations Association, http://ipoaonline.org/en/
standards/code.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
117 Id. Currently, there are twenty-six PMFs that are members of the IPOA
and have signed onto the voluntary code of conduct. One of these members in-
cludes the previously discussed MPRI. See id.; see supra Part II.A.ii.
118 Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 2005); see also Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2005).
119 See Frye, supra note 18, at 2634; see also 22 C.F.R. § 120.1.
120 See International Transfer of Arms Regulation, 15 C.F.R. §§ 701.1, 701.3(a)
(2005). There is evidence that the previous statutory requirement was for con-
tracts more than $50 million U.S. dollars rather than $5 million U.S. dollars. See
Frye, supra note 18, at 2634 ("Congress must be notified before the export of mili-
tary services in excess of U.S. $50 million"); Stinnett, supra note 5, at 218 ("the
State Department must individually approve (after Congressional notification)
each specific PMF contract in excess of U.S. $50 million"); Singer, War, Profits, and
the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 539 ("under current U.S. law, as long as the
contract amount is under US $50 million, any U.S. military firm can work abroad
with or without notifying Congress").
20061
15
PACE INT'L L. REV.
ment, there is the possibility that contracts awarded to these
companies will largely be rubber-stamped.
In response to the rise of PMFs, the military has modified
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)-the laws which
govern the conduct of U.S. military personnel-to include civil-
ians abroad, including those personnel who work closely with
American GIs.121 The 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion Act allows civilians working for U.S. military operations
overseas to be punished under the UCMJ when they engage in
conduct that would constitute a UCMJ violation. 122 Like the
AECA, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act only pro-
vides partial regulation since it only applies to U.S. citizens
working directly for the U.S. Department of Defense. 123 It does
not apply to U.S. citizens working for other government agen-
cies (such as the CIA), private entities, or foreign governments
or organizations. 24
A third option for holding PMFs accountable is through the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which gives district courts juris-
diction over civil actions brought by an alien for acts "committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."' 25 Enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
ATCA was rarely invoked over the subsequent two centuries
until 1980 when the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
interpreted the ATCA to give a forum for aliens suing for en-
forcement of their rights under international law.126 While the
ATCA would allow individual aliens to sue PMFs for their
human rights abuses, the ATCA is limited by jurisdictional re-
quirements and it would be extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
121 See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3267 (Lexis-
Nexis 2005); see also Frye, supra note 18, at 2634.
122 See 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 3261, 3267.
123 See id.; Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 537;
The Privatized Military: The Unmonitored, Unregulated, and Unchecked Global
Growth of Private Military Firms. An Interview with Peter W. Singer, MULTINAT'L
MONITOR, Mar. 2004, at 25, available at http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2004I
04marchlmarch04interviewsinger.html [hereinafter Interview with Singer].
124 See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 537;
Interview with Singer, supra note 123.
125 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
126 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Gar-
mon, supra note 9, at 339-40.
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establish in personam jurisdiction over PMFs not based in the
United States. 127
C. Domestic Regulation in Other Countries
South Africa, largely in reaction to Executive Outcome's ac-
tivities in Angola and Sierra Leone, passed the Regulation of
Foreign Military Assistance Act (RFMAA) in 1998.128 The
RFMAA, like its American counterpart AECA, regulates any of-
fer of foreign military assistance by mandating that any person
(including foreign nationals and corporations) 129 wishing to of-
fer military assistance submit an application to the National
Conventional Arms Control Committee, which in turn makes a
recommendation to the Minister of Defence.130 Foreign military
assistance includes "advice or training," "personnel, financial,
logistical, intelligence or operational support," "personnel re-
cruitment," "medical or para-medical services," or "procurement
of equipment."1 31 Under Article 7, any license will not be ap-
proved if it is in conflict with South Africa's obligations under
international law, infringes on human rights and fundamental
freedoms, endangers the peace or escalates conflict within the
region, or promotes or supports terrorism. 132 The punishment
for a violation of the RFMAA is a fine or imprisonment and a
forfeiture of any equipment involved. 133 The RFMVAA also ap-
plies extraterritorially, so a violator of the act may still be pros-
ecuted even if the wrongful act occurred outside of South
Africa.134
The main problem with this regulation is its lack of enforce-
ability 3 5 since companies could easily slip through the net of
the Minister of Defence and the National Conventional Arms
Control Committee. However, the enactment of this statute has
127 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 221.
128 See Frye, supra note 18, at 2635.
129 See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 1 JSRSA, art.
l(vi), available at www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-acts/1998/actl5.pdf.
130 See id. at arts. 1(ii), 1(v), 4(1)-(2).131 Id. at art. l(iii)(a)(i)-(v.
132 See id. at art. 7(a)-(f).
133 See id. at art. 8; see also Frye, supra note 18, at 2636.
134 See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance, supra note 129, at art. 9.
The only time the act would not grant jurisdiction is if a non-South African citizen
committed the wrongful act outside of South Africa.
135 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 118.
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at least shown that South Africa is serious in its efforts to en-
sure that PMFs operate within the law. The passing of this pro-
vision was part of the reason that Executive Outcomes (EO)
disbanded in South Africa. 136 Finally, it should also be noted
that although many African nations are hosts to PMFs, only
South Africa has developed a regulatory scheme. 137 South Af-
rica's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act has done
the most to help regulate PMFs and curb human rights
abuses. 138
D. International Regulatory Options
A mercenary was first defined in international law by Arti-
cle 47 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977 ("Protocol I").139 Under
Protocol I:
A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised by or on behalf of a
Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in ex-
cess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and
functions in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of
the territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;
and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict
on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 140
136 See id.
137 See Frye, supra note 18, at 2637.
138 See generally id. at 2643.
139 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 47,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
140 Id. at art. 47(2).
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Additionally, Article 47 denies mercenaries the right to be a
combatant or a prisoner-of-war (POW).141 This denial of POW
status differed from customary international law, which gave
mercenaries the same status as members of the regular armed
forces. 142 This backlash against mercenaries likely occurred be-
cause of the havoc and instability they caused in Africa in the
1960's and 1970's. 143 Protocol I was widely adopted, 44 with the
exception of the United States, which maintained that Article
47 was not an expression of current customary law. 145
In 1989, the International Convention Against the Recruit-
ment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries ("Conven-
tion Against Mercenaries") expanded the definition of
mercenaries. 146 In addition to the elements laid down by Proto-
col I, the Convention Against Mercenaries further defined a
mercenary:
A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of par-
ticipating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the
constitutional order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or pay-
ment of material compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which
such an act is directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
141 See id. at art. 47(1). In the original Geneva Conventions, no mention was
made of mercenaries or a denial of POW status to them. See Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
142 See Milliard, supra note 4, at 35-36.
143 See id. at 34.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 37-38. There was also a concern that if the purpose of Protocol I
was to expand humanitarian protection, then it is very dangerous to create catego-
ries of combatants, some of whom are protected and others who are not. The
United States argued that if guerillas and unconventional combatants were in-
cluded under Protocol I, then there was no reason why mercenaries should be ex-
cluded. See id.
146 See International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries, at art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 72d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44134 (Dec. 4, 1989) [hereinafter Convention Against Mercenaries].
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(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose
territory the act is undertaken. 147
This Convention was not nearly as well received by the world
community and only twelve states originally passed it, while
twenty-two were necessary for it to enter into force. 148 It was
not until 2001 when Costa Rica became the twenty-second state
party that the Convention actually entered into force. 149
There are multiple shortcomings of the Convention Against
Mercenaries, most notably its lack of world support, especially
among the major powers-none of which have signed it.150 Sec-
ondly, both Protocol I and the Convention Against Mercenaries
only focus on individuals as mercenaries and make no mention
of mercenaries as part of a corporation.1 51 PMPs, as members
of a corporation and not simply individual soldiers of fortune, do
not fall within the definition set down by Protocol I or the Con-
vention Against Mercenaries, even though common sense says
they are soldiers paid to participate in an armed conflict. 52
The problem with defining what a mercenary is runs
deeper than simply choosing the correct verbiage. Even if the
definition were reworked to include PMFs and PMPs, the
amount of support for this new definition would likely be mini-
mal. As discussed above, most nations value PMFs and depend
on the services they provide so they would be unlikely to sign
anything that makes PMF activity illegal. 153 Secondly, even
though both mercenaries and PMPs fight in conflicts for mone-
tary compensation, the world does not view a PMP as a type of
mercenary. 54 An illustration of this comes from inside the
147 Id. at art. 1(2).
148 See Milliard, supra note 4, at 64.
149 See id. at 64-65.
150 See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 531.
151 See Coleman, supra note 74, at 1510.
152 See id.; see also Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note
11, at 534.
153 See discussion supra Part II.B.
154 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Re-
port of the Special Rapporteur, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and its
Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation:
Use of Mercenaries as a means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exer-
cise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, 1 60, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/14
(Dec. 8, 2004)(prepared by Shaista Shameem) [hereinafter Report of the Special
Rapporteur].
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U.N. In her annual report to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. Special Rapporteur Shaista Shameem discussed
some of the human rights abuses committed by PMPs.155 In her
conclusion, the Special Rapporteur said that mercenaries
should not be confused with other actors in the field, including
private security companies. 156
The Special Rapporteur went on to recommend exploring
the option of licensing and regulating private security compa-
nies, either through international registration or domestic legis-
lation, for the purpose of creating accountability and
distinguishing these legitimate companies from other organiza-
tions engaged in mercenary activity. 157 First, this statement
suggests that the U.N. does not see PMFs as mercenaries but
rather as members of their own separate category. This view is
shared by at least one academic, Deborah Avant, who cites PMF
corporate structure, their operation in an open market, and the
activities they perform as factors that differentiate them from
mercenaries of the past. 158 Secondly, the U.N. wants to regu-
late the industry, but it does not want to ban it. 1 9 Making pri-
vate security companies illegal was never even mentioned in
the Report of the Special Rapporteur. 160 This is due not only to
the fact that there is no popular support among nations for this
measure, but also because the U.N. and its members do not be-
lieve it would benefit the world. 161 Therefore, because nations
do not want to ban PMFs and do not see them as mercenaries,
trying to fit them into a "mercenary" category and attempting to
use Protocol I and the Convention Against Mercenaries as a
way to criminalize PMF activity is a useless exercise.
155 See id. IT 46-52.
156 See id. 60.
157 See id. 66.
158 See Avant, supra note 86, at *2.
159 See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 154, 1 60, 66.
160 See id. $11 46-52, 60, 66.
161 See id.
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IV. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR "A-TEAM[SI" IN THE FORM OF
POW STATUS
A. Why Private Military Personnel Should Be Given POW
Status
1. Legitimacy
The sooner private military personnel (PMPs) are given
prisoner-of-war (POW) status, the sooner their activities will be
viewed as legitimate. It is evident that PMPs do not fall under
the official definition of mercenaries. 162 They work for publicly-
traded companies that operate on the open market and, while
they need to be licensed and regulated, 163 they do not resemble
the mercenaries of the 1960's and 1970's that plagued Africa.' 64
Throughout history, hired soldiers were a necessity for going to
war and were not looked down upon as inferior or illegal. 165 It
is only recently that mercenaries have been viewed with suspi-
cion or disdain, due largely to the horrors they committed on
the African continent after World War 11.166 It is also evident
that nations, non-governmental organizations, and interna-
tional corporations find PMF services extremely valuable. 167
PMFs are being used now and their use will likely expand in the
near future. As discussed above, there is great potential to use
PMPs for humanitarian missions. 68 However, the use of PMFs
has only recently come to light and the public is largely igno-
rant of the depth of their role in operations in Iraq and around
the world. This ignorance will not last forever and the public
may react negatively to governments employing soldiers-for-
hire, especially if the trend continues and PMPs begin to occupy
mission-essential positions. If this is the case, negative public
opinion will significantly curb the use of PMFs and national ar-
mies will be forced to undergo the painful and expensive process
of trying to de-privatize jobs that have already been outsourced.
However, if PMPs are given POW status and effective PMF reg-
ulations are put in place, they will be treated as legitimate and
162 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
163 See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 154, 66.
164 See discussion supra Part II.D.ii.
165 See discussion supra Part II.A-B, D.
166 See discussion supra Part II.D.ii.
167 See supra Part II.A-B.
168 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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professional soldiers, like the Condottieri in Renaissance It-
aly,169 rather than as ruthless mercenaries.
2. Certainty
As it stands right now, no one is really sure what status
private military personnel (PMPs) occupy in international
law. 170 They are neither soldiers of national government nor
mercenaries under the Convention Against Mercenaries. 171
Sometimes PMPs are subject to the domestic law of the terri-
tory in which they operate, while other times they must answer
to the laws of their home country, but it is often unclear which
one applies.172 For example, the Coalition government in Iraq
stated that PMPs would be subject to the laws of their home
country, but as discussed above, most domestic law, including
U.S. law, is too narrow to cover PMF activities. 173 As PMPs
have already begun to take a more active role in combat opera-
tions, including the use of lethal force, they also are put at a
higher risk of being captured without receiving POW status
protections. 174 These protections include the right to be treated
humanely (art. 13), 17 5 the right to be free from physical or
mental torture (art. 17),176 the right to be given daily food ra-
tions (art. 26)177 and clothing (art. 27),178 the right for officers
not to be forced to do manual labor (art. 49),179 and the right to
be tried only by a court that offers "the essential guarantees of
independence and impartiality" (art. 84),180 including the right
to call witnesses in one's defense and to have the assistance of a
qualified advocate (art. 105).181 This uncertainty of prisoner-of-
war status would likely lead to confusion on the part of the cap-
169 See discussion supra Part II.D.
170 See Avant, supra note 86, at *5.
171 See supra Part III.D.
172 See Avant, supra note 86, at *5.
173 See id.; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
174 See Avant, supra note 86, at *5; see also Geneva Convention, supra note
141, at art. 47.
175 See Geneva Convention, supra note 141, at art. 13.
176 See id. at art. 17.
177 See id. at art. 26.
178 See id. at art. 27.
179 See id. at art. 49.
180 See id. at art. 84.
181 See id. at art. 105.
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tors on how they are legally obligated to treat captured PMPs.
This could lead to PMPs being viewed as illegal combatants and
receiving no legal protection. Since they are not national
soldiers, they would likely receive little, if any, diplomatic sup-
port from their home country; additionally, they could not de-
pend on the leadership of the company they work for to plead
their case on their behalf.
3. Fairness
While much has been made of PMPs committing human
rights abuses, PMPs have also been the victims of these abuses.
In March 2004, four American contractors from Blackwater Se-
curity Consulting were killed in Fallujah, Iraq.18 2 Two of their
bodies were mutilated, dragged through the streets, and hung
from a bridge over the Euphrates River.18 3 Their bodies were
later "cut down, burned, dragged behind a cart, tied to a car,
and driven away."18 4 In Colombia in 2003, the terrorist group
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) abducted
three American contractors from Northrop Grumman after
their plane crashed due to engine failure.18 5 FARC allowed a
Colombian reporter to interview the hostages to prove that they
were still alive, but this was only a few months after their cap-
ture, and their fate as of the date of this article is unknown.18 6
As author Peter Singer stated, "The laws of war are not just
about regulating behaviour, but also about determining status
and ensuring that soldiers receive their due rights.'' 8 7 As the
line grays between a PMP working as a security guard protect-
ing a convoy or a building and a national soldier on patrol,
PMPs are in harm's way as much as regular soldiers but with-
out the legal protection of POW status. In Iraq, insurgents
have paid no heed to the distinction between PMPs and army
regulars.188 If there is no distinction between the two groups
182 See Frye, supra note 18, at 2069.
183 See id.
184 Id.
185 See McCallion, supra note 81, at 345-46.
186 See id.
187 Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 11, at 542.
188 See David Barstow, Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at Al.
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while the fighting is taking place, there should be no distinction
when they are captured by the enemy.
B. Methods of Granting POW status to "A-Team[s]"
1. International Convention
The most direct and effective way to ensure that PMPs are
given POW status when captured is for the international com-
munity to come together and recognize that this is something
that is not only fair to PMPs but also in the PMPs' best inter-
est.18 9 This recognition should go hand-in-hand with establish-
ing some sort of international licensing and regulation scheme,
which should be used to govern the actions of PMFs. By
presenting both the carrot of legal recognition and the stick of
enforceable regulation, the international community could
bring the use of PMFs out of legal uncertainty and into legiti-
mate practice.
While this sounds easy enough, trying to get the world com-
munity to agree on this may prove difficult. The issue is still
controversial and the record of PMFs has been blemished by
events such as the DynCorp sex scandal in Bosnia and PMP in-
volvement in Abu Gharib. 190 Also, nations might be content
with PMPs not having any legally protected status as combat-
ants. Governments are required to ensure that their own
soldiers are treated fairly, but PMPs do not belong to them.
Therefore, if by chance the Geneva Conventions are not com-
plied with, protesting such an action may not be the govern-
ment's highest priority. PMFs may also be a means for a
government to accomplish a military goal if its hands are tied
and the use of its own national military is prohibited, such as
MPRI's alleged assistance of the Croatian military in Operation
Storm.'91 This guarded desire to keep PMFs out of the main-
stream may prove a deterrent to PMPs receiving the POW pro-
tections they deserve.
189 See supra Part IV.A.i-ii.
190 See supra Part II.C.
191 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 125.
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2. National Efforts
While it would be a step in the right direction for national
legislation to recognize the legitimacy of PMFs, POW status is
something found in international law. National legislation will
only ensure PMPs protection when they are fighting alongside
that nation's military or on its soil.192 For PMPs to be protected
regardless of where they operate, it will take an international
effort.
However, once it is determined what legal status PMPs
should occupy, the information can be disseminated on a na-
tional level. One way would be national legislation, but the
most effective way would be through a rewriting of military
manuals, which set out general guidelines on how military offi-
cials must conduct themselves. In addition to this, in the U.S.
(and presumably in other countries), before any force deploys
overseas, they are given a legal briefing that includes the status
of different individuals they encounter and how the military
personnel should treat them.193 These groups of individuals
usually include the local population, un-uniformed insurgents,
etc. 194 PMPs will simply be one more group added to the brief.
3. Custom
Perhaps the actual way PMPs will retain equal status with
regular combat troops is the way mercenaries did in previous
parts of history-through state practice. 195 Until the 1970's
and the passing of Protocol I, mercenaries were treated as if
they were members of the regular army which had hired
them.' 96 There are even accounts of the mercenaries treating
POWs more humanely than the soldiers of the belligerent force.
In the American Revolutionary War, George Washington noted
that the Hessian mercenaries gave captured Colonial soldiers
much kinder treatment than British officers and soldiers. 97
192 See e.g., Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3267 (Lex-
isNexis 2005).
193 The author of this article graduated from the AFROTC program and is a
commissioned officer in the United States Air Force.
194 Id.
195 See discussion supra Part III.D.
196 See Milliard, supra note 4, at 35-36.
197 See THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD
79 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994).
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Now that private soldiers are beginning to become more
commonplace in military theatres, state practice may revert
back to treating hired soldiers as equals rather than as
criminals. At least one non-state actor, FARC, has already done
this. 198 FARC, the group that captured the three American
PMPs in Columbia, granted the captured Americans POW sta-
tus, even when the U.S. government only designated them
kidnapees. 199 While it will take a lot more state and non-state
actors behaving consistently over a long period of time to estab-
lish treatment of PMPs as an international custom, it is still a
step in the right direction.
V. CONCLUSION
"A-Team[s]" are no longer fictional fantasies come to life on
the small screen. Private military personnel (PMPs) working
for private military firms (PMFs) that sell military support,
strategy, training and combat-ready units to whomever is will-
ing to pay, are now a reality and are major actors in any mili-
tary engagement. Like the mercenaries of antiquity and the
Middle Ages, most of these private soldiers used to be members
of State militaries before those armies downsized. 200 Unlike
most other groups of mercenaries, these new "A-Team[s]" oper-
ate under corporate structures for publicly traded companies. 201
Some scholars believe they are dangerous and should be heavily
regulated, while others point out their potential to aid in hu-
manitarian efforts. 20 2 Regardless of what scholars think, PMFs
are already so integrated into most national military operations
that they are here to stay. However, due to the mushrooming of
the industry in the last fifteen years, the international legal
structure has been slow to react and PMFs largely operate
outside the law. This is a double-edged sword where, on the one
hand, PMPs are not held accountable for the human rights
abuses they commit and, on the other hand, they have been the
victims of illegal acts and have not been afforded legal
protection.
198 See Avant, supra note 86, at *5.
199 See id.
200 See Stinnett, supra note 5, at 211.
201 See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 3, at 40.
202 See Milliard, supra note 4, at 85; Zarate, supra note 113, at 150-51.
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This Comment first explored the history of private actors in
military engagements. It discussed the two major types of
PMFs, including what services they provide and the military
operations in which they were involved. Secondly, it listed
some of the areas of the world in which PMFs are active today,
most prominently Iraq. It then focused both on the most hor-
rific mercenaries, Les Affreux ("the horrors") in post-colonial Af-
rica, as well as those private soldiers that bear the closest
resemblance to PMFs, the Condottieri of Renaissance Italy. In
Part III, it described and analyzed the efforts to regulate PMFs,
looking at domestic efforts in the United States and South Af-
rica as well as international efforts, citing the South African
case as the most successful. Part IV argued that, along with
regulation, PMPs should also be given prisoner-of-war (POW)
status in order to legitimize their use by governments, to give
certainty to their legal status, and to be fair to PMPs who are
increasingly moving out of a support role and putting them-
selves in harms way. It also suggested the possible methods of
granting POW status.
The one positive side effect of the extensive use of PMFs is
that the more they are used, the more likely they will be written
about, and knowledge of who they are and what they do will
become generally known among the public. The sooner this
happens, the sooner the debate over what status PMPs should
occupy, how they should be regulated, and how they should be
protected, will leave academia and enter into legislative build-
ings, a place where it desperately needs to be.
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